תלמוד על גיטין 1:2

It was stated: A student who gave instructions about practice in front of his teacher has committed a deadly sin²⁵Babli Berakhot 31b, Eruvin 63a, Yerushalmi Giṭṭin 1:2. This insert takes up the theme of unauthorized ruling from the previous story. However, in the previous case it was assumed that the student was not ordained; he is prohibited from giving instructions by a late rabbinic ordinance. In the present paragraph the student is ordained; nevertheless, he may not issue instructions at his teacher’s place by a Biblical injunction. (The story of Rebbi at Acco is continued in the next paragraph.). It was stated in the name of Rebbi Eliezer: Nadab and Abihu died only because they determined practice in the presence of their teacher Moses²⁶They died because they presented “a strange fire that was not commanded to them.” Since they must have had some rationale for their actions, it follows that they acted on their own judgment, not consulting their teacher Moses. Since Moses was not with them at that moment, it also follows that “in front of his teacher” means “while his teacher is alive”, in that case, in the encampment of the Israelites in the desert. Their argument is hinted at in Babli Yoma 53a.. It happened that a student gave instructions about practice in front of his teacher Rebbi Eliezer. The latter said to his wife Imma Shalom²⁷The sister of Rabban Gamliel. The parallel is in Babli Eruvin 63a; there R. Eliezer speaks of a year, not a week.: That one will not live out his week. The week was not completed when he died. His students said to him: Rebbi, you are a prophet. He said to them (Amos 7:14) “I am neither a prophet nor the disciple of a prophet” but I have received a tradition that any student who gives instructions about practice in front of his teacher has committed a deadly sin. It was stated: A student is forbidden to give instructions about practice during the lifetime of his teacher unless he be at a distance of at least 12 mil from him, [the breadth of] the camp of Israel. What is the reason? (Num. 33:49) “They encamped along the Jordan from Bet Hayyešimot to Abel Haššiṭṭim”; how far is this? Twelve mil²⁸In the Babli (Eruvin 55b,Yoma75b) this is a determination of Rabba bar bar Ḥana. The text here shows that in the Babli the reading “3 parasangs” (12 mil) of the mss. is to be preferred over “3 parasangs square” of the Venice edition, against the opinion of R. Rabbinovicz (Diqduqe Soferim Eruvin p. 224, Note.פ ) A mil is 2000 cubits, cf. Kilaim Chapter 5, Note 25.. Like this: Rebbi Tanḥum ben Ḥiyya was in Ḥefer²⁹The Biblical Gat Ḥefer, possibly the village El-Mešad near Kafr Kanna, not far from Sepphoris.; they asked him repeatedly and he gave instructions about practice. They said to him, did the rabbi not teach us that a student may not give instructions about practice during the lifetime of his teacher unless he be at a distance of at least 12 mil from him, [the breadth of] the camp of Israel; and your teacher Rebbi Mana sits at Sepphoris! He said to them, so it should come over me that I did not know! From that moment on he did no longer give instructions.

Does the document prove? Do we not have to believe what she says? If she did not say ‘it was written in my presence, it was signed in my presence’, would you permit her to remarry⁹¹Mishnah Giṭṭin 1:1 states that abill of divorce brought from far away is accepted by the local court only if the person delivering the bill testifies that it was executed in his presence and, therefore, he can be queried about the details of the execution. Without such testimony, the woman to whom the bill is addressed cannot be declared to be a divorcee free to remarry.? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, that parallels what Rebbi Abun said⁹²In Halakhah Giṭṭin 1:1., one does not suspect him to vilify her in the eyes of Heaven; he is suspect to vilify her in the eyes of the court⁹³If the husband would trick the messenger into delivering an invalid bill of divorce and the court would declare the woman free to remarry on that basis, the only consequence would be that the children of the divorcee from a second husband would be bastards in the eyes of Heaven. Since the divorce, once approved by a competent court, cannot be reversed, the second marriage will always be legitimate in the eyes of the public and the children will be legitimate and able to marry in the congregation. But the court has to be able to cross-examine him before it accepts the document to be sure that the husband had the bill signed by witnesses in good standing.. Since he knows that if he were to come [and object, his objection] would not be accepted⁹⁴In the Babli, this is the argument of Rava (cf. Chapter 1, Note 19). Another opinion there holds that the excluded women may deliver a bill of divorce only locally since then their testimony is not needed, as the testimony is not directly mentioned in Mishnah Giṭṭin 2:8. Since the Babli accepts Rava’s argument, it concurs that a bill of divorce duly accepted in a second court cannot be attacked by the husband., he has [the bill of divorce] signed by witnesses in good standing. And here, since she knows that her word does not count for the other woman, she will be truthful.

A Mishnah disagrees with him who says that he who may take may acquire, since we have stated¹¹⁶Giṭṭin 1:6. This paragraph is elliptic and almost incomprehensible. The Mishnah reads: “If someone says, give this divorce document to my wife or this document of manumission to my slave, and then wants to change his mind in either case, he may do so in the opinion of R. Meïr. But the Sages say, in the case of a wife, but not in the manumission of slaves since one may favor a person without his knowledge.” Since the divorce is considered bad for the wife, it can become valid only with her knowledge. R. Meïr thinks that manumission also may be bad for the slave who will have to accept all duties of a free Jew; the Sages consider manumission always to be good. With the wife’s knowledge, however, the emissary, a man, can acquire the divorce document for her. But as a man, he is not in a position ever to receive a divorce document.: “Give this divorce document to my wife …,” because he may receive the divorce document of his minor daughter¹¹⁷The minor daughter who was formally betrothed (קידושין) but not yet actually married, can become free to marry another man only by divorce. The bill of divorce must be accepted by her father, or by herself on the instruction of the father, since she becomes of age only by actual marriage. Hence, a man, while he cannot receive the document in question, is in theory able to receive some bills of divorce.. “And the document of manumission to my slave …,” since he may receive his own document of manumission¹¹⁸We have to assume that the emissary is a fellow slave who could receive his own manumission.. But did we not state¹¹⁹Mishnah Giṭṭin 6:1: “If someone says: Receive this divorce document for my wife, or convey this divorce document to my wife, and wants to change his mind, he may do so. If the woman said: Receive the divorce document for me, if he {the husband} wants to change his mind {after handing over the document}, he may not do so {since the transaction was done with the wife’s knowledge.}” That is the case if the emissary of the wife is a free man; she is divorced the moment the document comes into her emissary’s hand. But since a slave has no “hand” in the legal sense, how can this Mishnah be reconciled with the one quoted first?: “Receive this divorce document for my wife or bring this divorce document to my wife; if he wants to change his mind … he may not do so.” Is a slave empowered to bring a divorce document? Explain it by different cases¹¹⁷The minor daughter who was formally betrothed (קידושין) but not yet actually married, can become free to marry another man only by divorce. The bill of divorce must be accepted by her father, or by herself on the instruction of the father, since she becomes of age only by actual marriage. Hence, a man, while he cannot receive the document in question, is in theory able to receive some bills of divorce..