תלמוד על כתובות 9:1

“⁸⁶Tosephta Demay 7:14, the text is R. Ḥiyya’s. A similar baraita, dealing with a Levite selling to an Israel, appears in Babli Baba Batra 63a, also following R. Ḥiyya only. That all tithes should be mine as long as you own it, he gets its tithes as long as the buyer owns it.” When he sold it to a third party, he has no tithes. If the buyer then bought it back from the third party, Rebbi Ḥiyya states that he has no tithes, Rebbi Hoshaia states that the tithes are his. This disagreement turns out like the other disagreement, as we have stated there⁸⁷Mishnah Ketubot 9:13: “A woman who presents two letters of divorce and two ketubot collects two ketubot. Two ketubot and one letter of divorce, or one ketubah and two letters of divorce, or one ketubah, one letter of divorce, and a death, she collects only one ketubah since ‘he who divorces his wife and then remarries her, remarries her on the basis of the first ketubah.’ ” The ketubah is explained in Peah, Chapter 3, Note 151. The individual stipulations are obligations the groom takes upon himself in addition to the obligatory ketubah. “that he who divorces his wife and then remarries her, remarries her on the basis of the first ketubah.” Rebbi Ḥanin⁸⁸An Amora of the third Galilean generation, student of R. Samuel bar Isaac; a frequent author of aggadic statements. The statement here, which appears in identical form in Ketubot 9:13 (fol. 33c), is his only known halakhic statement. stated before Rebbi La: Two Amoraïm, one says for ketubah but not for individual stipulations, and the other says, both for ketubah and individual stipulations. For him who says, for ketubah but not for individual stipulations, he has the tithes⁸⁹This refers to the Mishnah and the case that the husband dies and the widow presents two ketubot and one bill of divorce. If one assumes that the argument of the Mishnah applies only to the obligatory ketubah, she collects the amount of one obligatory ketubah but both individual stipulations; hence, the remarrying does not eliminate the validity of the first ketubah. In our case, the repurchasing of the field does not eliminate the first contract and the Cohen re-enters into his rights to tithes. (The Babli, Ketubot 90a, which does not consider the case of demay presented by R. Hoshaia, holds that if the date of the letter of divorce is between the dates of the two ketubot, she collects both ketubot in full.). For him who says, both for ketubah and for individual stipulations, he has no tithes⁹⁰In that case, the first ketubah is invalidated completely, as is the Cohen’s contract of sale. (This is the only case considered by the Babli, Baba Batra 63a.). But did we not state⁹¹Tosephta Demay 7:9; there it is spelled out: בת כהן.: “If somebody received (as sharecropper) from the daughter of a Cohen, she has the tithes⁹²Since heave is eaten not only by a Cohen but also by his entire family, her claim is as good as her father’s.. If she married an Israel⁹³She becomes a member of her husband’s family and loses her priestly status. Hence, all rules for the Israel apply to her., they split the tithes. If she was widowed or divorced⁹⁴It is implied that she has no surviving descendants from her Israel husband. Otherwise, her status remains that of an Israel (Lev. 22:13)., she returns to her prior status.” There when he sold, here when he received⁹⁵Since the sharecropper never had title to the land, it is only her status that decides in matters of tithes.. But did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state: “When she sold?⁹⁶This baraita is not in the Tosephta. R. Ḥiyya, who holds that the Cohen loses all his rights when the Israel sells the field to a third party, states that the daughter of a Cohen who sells her field to an Israel while retaining her rights to tithes, and who loses half of the tithes on her marriage to an Israel, can reclaim all her rights as a childless divorcee or widow. The problem is to reconcile the two statements of R. Ḥiyya; the answer is that in the second case the rights of the seller are only suspended, not eliminated.” Rebbi Samuel bar Eudaimon said, there it left the power of both parties; here, it left the power of the seller but not that of the buyer.

HALAKHAH: “If he married her, she is his wife in every respect”, etc. What does he do? “He marries her, he may divorce her and take her back, and she writes him a receipt for her ketubah.”⁹¹This opinion is not mentioned in the Babli. There, the opinion opposed to that of Abbai is that of Rava, who holds that the widow can only dispose of her property before “bespeaking”. For him, “bespeaking” for the House of Shammai makes the widow a wife in civil but not in criminal matters, while qiddushin makes the unencumbered woman a wife in criminal but not in civil matters. Rebbi Yose said, the baraita has two possibilities. “Or she writes him a receipt for her ketubah.”⁹⁸If he takes her back before she received the payment of her ketubah, she obviously does not write a receipt. R. Yose wants to point out that the baraita quoted here is not the Tosephta Ketubot 9:1: “If somebody died and left his widow waiting for the levir, even if his estate is a hundred minas and her ketubah only one mina, the heirs cannot sell anything since her ketubah is a lien on the entire estate. What can he do? He marries her, divorces her, and she writes a receipt for her ketubah.” Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rav Hamnuna: If he married her, divorced her, and took her back, if he wrote her a new ketubah, the lien is on his property; otherwise, it is on the property of her first husband. Rebbi Yose said in the name of Rav Ḥisda, a Mishnah said so: “For he who takes back his wife, takes her back under the terms of her first ketubah⁹⁹Mishnah Ketubot 9:9..” At the end, if he married her, divorced her, and took her back? He tells you something new. Even if he married her, divorced her, and took her back, if he wrote her a new ketubah¹⁰⁰If she refuses to come back under the old terms, her lien extends to the entire property of the levir., the lien is on his property; otherwise, it is on the property of her first husband.

HALAKHAH: “One creates an opening for a man with his wife’s ketubah” etc. Does one collect from movables⁷⁹It is talmudic theory that debts covered by a document (such as a ketubah or a mortgage) must be satisfied by foreclosing real estate (unless otherwise stated in the document of indebtedness). It was only after the Arab conquest, when the Jews in Babylonia had lost their real estate holdings, that the Gaonic authorities decreed that every ketubah must be paid in currency and/or movables. How could R. Aqiba order the man to cut off and sell his hair to pay his ex-wife since cut hair clearly is movable? (The Babli explains that the man should hand over all his real estate to his wife and sell his hair to buy food for himself.)? Rebbi Abba said, even if one could say, one collects from movables, one tells him to pay⁸⁰It seems that one has here a disagreement of the two Talmudim (explanation of I. Eisenstein in עמודי ירושלים ad loc.). The Babli sticks to its thesis that a ketubah is satisfied only by real estate and holds that a partially satisfied ketubah represents a title to all future property the ex-husband might acquire. The Yerushalmi holds that if the husband cannot satisfy his divorcee’s claim with real estate, one tells him to satisfy it with any other means available.. Rebbi Manisha asked, could one tell the heirs to collect from pledged property⁸¹If this would refer to real estate, the question would be trivial. Mortgaged or otherwise pledged property is part of the inheritance. Standard mortgages (including ketubah) are not on a specified piece of land but on all holdings of the debtor. If the debtor dies, the entire property comes to the heirs from whom the mortgage holder can require satisfaction under the supervision of the court.
The quote with which the question is answered shows clearly that the issue is about movables. Then it cannot be a question of mortgages other than a ketubah. The question is whether the court can order the heirs to honor their father’s obligation to his ex-wife from movables, to let her collect from movables.? Rebbi Abba Mari said, the Mishnah says that one does not say so, as we have stated there⁸²Mishnah Ketubot 9:2. In the Mishnah, R. Aqiba states that the heirs take all movables since any creditor would have to swear that his claim was not in any way satisfied by the deceased but the heirs take everything without oath. (R. Tarphon disagrees and would give the widow preference).: “It should be given to the heirs since everybody has to swear but the heirs do not have to swear.” What does one make her swear? There, they say, from straw I did not collect, from his person I did collect⁸³“There” is Babylonia. It is difficult to understand what is meant. It seems that she has to swear that her claim was not satisfied even in an indirect way..