תלמוד על נדרים 3:1

HALAKHAH: “Partners who mutually made vows not to have usufruct from one another,” etc. The rabbis say, every single [square] hand-breadth is common property of the partners. Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob says, each one enters into what is his. If the courtyard was divided by pebbles⁶Greek ψῆφος. If at some time they decide to mark the borders between the domains belonging to the different houses by rows of pebbles cemented into the ground, this amounts to a division of the common property and the rabbis will not hold that a formal contract is needed to disestablish the former common domain. (In modern Hebrew, the word means “mosaic”.), even the rabbis agree. If one of them went and sold his part, even Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob agrees⁷If one of the partners sells his part, he can no longer claim to enter into what is his and even according to R. Eliezer ben Jacob he is forbidden to set foot in the courtyard.. If they contracted between themselves to concede⁸They split the common courtyard as outlined in Baba batra but in the contract agreed that they would not insist on excluding the other party from entering the separate domain of the other party. Then for the rabbis the split did not change anything., it is still in the hands of the partners. It is only needed if they did not contract between themselves to concede; what is the position of Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob? And did we not state there, “he buys higher and sells lower⁹Chapter 3, Note 147. Does R. Eliezer ben Jacob permit transactions at the regular price?”? What is the position of Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob? And did we not state there, “he should not lend him nor ask him for anything¹⁰Chapter 4, Note 99. Since no transfer of property is involved, does R. Eliezer ben Jacob agree?,”? What is the position of Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob? And what Rebbi Simeon ben Yaqim said, that he should not stay long¹¹Chapter 4, Note 76. Does R. Eliezer ben Jacob agree that the visits have to be as short as possible??

A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Ḥaninah: “A vow that no Cohanim or Levites should have any advantage from me, they should take against his will⁶²Mishnah Nedarim 3:11. This is one of the vows the husband cannot dissolve if made by his wife since dissolution is unnecessary; any recipient of the obligatory gifts to Cohen and Levite may take them by force in this case, and the owner has no monetary gain. It seems to disagree with R. Joḥanan who says that the owner has the choice of recipient. But since the owner does not want to give what he is obligated to, he transgresses commandments of the Torah and the situation can be saved only by others disregarding his rights..” He explains it about a person who says, I cannot possibly give them any gifts. You should know that this is so, since we have stated: “These Cohanim and Levites, let others take⁶³Same Mishnah; if the vow excludes a certain group of people, he always can give to others..” A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “An Israel can say to another Israel, here you have a tetradrachma and give this first born to my daughter’s son, a Cohen⁶⁴Speaking of the firstborn of a cow or ewe. In the Babli (Bekhorot27a) a similar statement is made for future heave. Both statements are taken together in Tosephta Demay 5:18: “An Israel may say to a Cohen {it seems that it should read: another Israel, but there is absolutely no manuscript evidence for that} here you have a tetradrachma and give heave to my daughter’s son, the Cohen, or give a firstborn to my daughter’s son, the Cohen.” The Babli does not want to accept the statement about the firstborn since the Cohen might think the tetradrachma is redemption money and the firstborn does not have to be treated as a sacrifice..” He explains, if he already wanted to give it to two Cohanim and that daughter’s son was one of them; then one said, here you have a tetradrachma and give all of it to my daughter’s son, a Cohen⁶⁵Indirect usufruct is permitted by R. Joḥanan..

There¹⁶²Mishnah Nedarim 3:6 and the relevant Halakhah (Notes 110–121). The text here does not make any sense and is not intended to make any sense. The Genizah fragment starts the quote of the Mishnah; the missing part of the line contained an instruction to continue the text in Nedarim. The same is intended here. We have a quote of the start of the Mishnah and a few words from the first paragraph of the Halakhah, ending with a complete copy of the last sentence, a sign that the copy now starts in earnest. It is clear that both scribes of the Genizah and the Leiden mss. considered the Nedarim text as the original for Qiddušin. For the reader’s convenience, here is the text omitted by the scribes:
Halakhah 6: “These orchard trees shall be qorbān,” etc. If he saw the king’s cutting crew coming near, if he saw fire coming near, and he said: These orchard trees shall be qorbān if they are not cut, this garment shall be qorbān if it is not burned or torn. Were they sanctified retroactively or only for the future? What is the difference? If he used them. If you say that they are sanctified retroactively, he committed larceny. If you say that it refers to the future, he did not commit larceny., it was stated: “These orchard trees shall be qorbān if they are not cut, this garment shall be qorbān if it is not burned.” And it was burned. Were they sanctified retroactively? He committed larceny. If you say that it refers to the future, he did not commit larceny.