תלמוד על נדרים 8:1

HALAKHAH: “All substitute names of vows are like vows,” etc. It is written¹²Num. 30:3. “Any person who vows,” why does the verse say “a vow”? From here that substitute names of vows are like vows. “Or he swears,” why does the verse say “an oath”? From here that substitute names of oaths are like oaths. “But any ban,¹³Lev. 27:28.” why does the verse say “which he bans”? From here that substitute names of bans are like bans. “A vow of nazir¹⁴Num. 6:2.”, why does the verse say “to be a nazir”? From here that substitute names of nazir vows are like nazir vows. So far for Rebbi Aqiba who says that these are expressions of additions. ¹⁵Cf. Yebamot 8:1, Note 72, Babli Avodah zarah 27a (and another 18 times without attribution). The quotes are from speeches of Laban and Joseph in Gen. which have no legal implications. This proves that the repetitions are a matter of style. For Rebbi Ismael who said, these are double expressions in the normal style of the Torah, “going you went, desiring you desired, by stealing I was stolen”, from where? “¹²Num. 30:3. Any person who vows a vow to the Eternal or swears an oath to forbid a prohibition on himself shall not profane his word,” why does the verse say “he must fulfill anything coming out of his mouth”? From here that substitute names of vows are like vows and substitute names of oaths are like oaths¹⁶The second half of the verse is clearly written for emphasis. It implies (a) that a vow is valid only if pronounced, not if only thought of and (b) that any speech which can be interpreted as a vow is a vow.
The Babli, 3a/b, quotes both the argument in the style of R. Aqiba and that of R. Ismael without mentioning any names.. And from where that substitute names of bans are like bans? “A vow, a vow”¹⁷This is an application of the second hermeneutical rule of gezerah šawah “equal cut”. If it was established in Num. 30:3 that “vow” means “anything that implies a vow” and in Lev. 27:2 any dedication to the Temple, including bans, is classified as “vow”, it follows that anything which implies a ban is a ban.. Since “a vow” at one place means that substitute names of vows are like vows and substitute names of oaths are like oaths, “a vow” at the other place means that substitute names of bans are like bans. And from where that substitute names of being a nazir are like being a nazir? “A vow, a vow”¹⁸Again this is an application of gezerah šawah, but this time the reference quote is Num. 6:2, cf. Note 14.. Since “a vow” at one place means that substitute names of oaths are like oaths¹⁹This reference is odd since the argument is about vows, not oaths. One has to assume that the scribe left out the relevant portion of the sentence which should be identical to the one used in the preceding case., “a vow” at the other place means that substitute names of being a nazir are like being a nazir.

Do the Sages permit all kinds of vows? “Four kinds of vows did the Sages dissolve”! Rebbi Eleazar in the name of the elder Rebbi Ḥiyya: Those do not need the permission of a Sage¹⁰In the Babli, this is the authoritative opinion of Samuel, 21b..¹¹Rosh (R. Asher ben Ieḥiel (~ 1250 Germany - 1327 Toledo) quotes (3,1) a different text: רִבִּי שִׁמעוֹן בַר רַבָּא בְשֵׁם רִבִּי יוֹחָנָן אֵילּוּ אֵין צְרִיכִין הֵתֵר חָכָם. רַב וּשְׁמוּאֵל דְּאָֽמְרֵי תְּרַװַייהוּ. אֵין צְרִיכִין הֵיתֵר חָכָם. “Rebbi Simeon ben Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: these need the permission of a Sage. Rav and Samuel both say: they do not need the permission of a Sage.” It is obvious that this cannot be the Yerushalmi text since דְּאָֽמְרֵי תְּרַװַייהוּ is pure Babylonian Aramaic. Rav and Samuel both say that these need the permission of a Sage¹²In the Babli, this is the rejected opinion of Rav Assi (Issy).. Issy objected: Did we not find an opening for vows from there only¹³This is confirmed in the Babli, 21a, where Rav Assi holds that a vow can be dissolved by a Sage (an ordained rabbi) only if its invalidity is obvious, not because the person making the vow repents his action.? Samuel said to him, bind a rope on it¹⁴It is not quite clear what this expression means. It might be that this kind of obviously void vow is the “rope with which one lifts other kinds of vows” to dissolution.. A Mishnah disagrees with Issy¹⁵Mishnah 8:7, speaking of a person who threatens to forbid to himself all intercourse with another if the other refuses to take gifts from him.: “This one also can dissolve his vow without asking a Sage.” He explains it, that all vows need an opening from another place but these have their openings in themselves¹⁶It still needs to be dissolved by a Sage but the dissolution is granted automatically.. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, that is, if they do not insist¹⁷If the person never had intended that the offered price should be the final price. R. Nissim Gerondi (“Ran”), in quoting this Yerushalmi (Commentary to the Babli, 21a), holds that the three sheqels quoted in the Mishnah are only an example and that any price between 2 and 4 denarii is acceptable but that the seller may not sell for 4 and the buyer not buy for 2 denarii without confirming their vows as real and requiring the counsel of a Sage.. But if they did insist they need the permission of a Sage. If one did insist but the other did not insist, since this one’s is invalid, the other one’s also should be invalid¹⁸If, e. g., the seller makes the same vow for two customers and he intends to insist on the full price for one but not for the other, his vow for the first is void since it is void for the second. (Concurrent explanation of Ran and Rashba.). A student of Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Julianus said [after] Rebbi Yudan: If one asked a tetradrachma, one was ready to give him three¹⁹Denarii., and another one said a sheqel. (Does he insist?)²⁰This is missing in the text quoted by Rashba (Novellae, Chapter 3, 20b), probably correctly. (This text not quoted by Ran.) Since he renounces one denar for this one he may renounce another one for the other one and give it to him for two²¹It would be incorrect to read the Mishnah as not permitting the seller to lower the price more than half the original difference. (Cf. Note 17.).

HALAKHAH: “Vows in connection with acts of God: His friend made him vow,” etc. because he fell ill. Therefore, if he did not fall ill, no⁹⁰It is a valid vow which must be kept.. Rebbi Jeremiah said, this is Rebbi Meïr’s, since Rebbi Meïr said, “he is forbidden until he gives⁹¹Mishnah 8:11: “If somebody says to his friend, a qônām that I shall not have anything from you unless you come and take so and so much grain and wine for your son, he can annul his vow alone by saying, I said that only for my honor and that is my honor. But one who says, a qônām that you will not have anything from me unless you give so and so much grain and wine to my son, R. Meïr says he is forbidden until he gives. But the Sages say, this one also can annul his vow alone by saying, it is as if I received it.”.” Rebbi Yose said, why do we not explain it according to everybody⁹²Since the entire vow falls under the category of speeding-up vows. But in the case of 8:11 there is another principle involved.? As my teacher said⁹³R. Ze‘ira, in Halakhah 8:11, explaining the difference between R. Meïr and the Sages., they disagree when it was indeterminate. Where do we hold? If each one of them said, because of my honor, everybody agrees that he is forbidden⁹⁴Both parties agree that they meant the vow to mean what it said; the vow is valid.. If one of them said, because of my honor, and the other said, I said it in your honor, everybody agrees he is permitted⁹⁵Since the vow never was accepted by the other party.. Rebbi Hila said, is it the way of people to say χαρίζεσθαι βίᾳ⁹⁶An interpretation by N. Brüll (cf. Note 70, p. 138), erroneously ascribed to Jastrow by S. Lieberman (p. 34). Lieberman reads כורוסתי instead of בורוסתי of the Leiden ms., כורוסתי of the editio princeps.
As Lieberman explains, in Egyptian legal papyri one frequently finds the formula ὁμολογῶ χαρίζεσθαί σοι “I agree that I gave you”. R. Hila asked, would anybody say ὁμολογῶ χαρίζεσθαί σοι βίᾳ “I agree that I gave you by force?” A gift can be given only with the consent of the recipient; in the case of Mishnah 8:11, a vow involving a gift can be valid only with the agreement of both parties.?