תלמוד על שבועות 3:1

MISHNAH: Exaggeration vows: If he said³¹In all these cases, it is understood that he says such and such should be qônām for me if …, if I did not see on this road [crowds] like those who left Egypt³²About 600‘000 men; Ex. 12:37.; if I did not see a snake [as thick] as the beam of the olive press. Vows in error how? If he said, if I ate or drank, and he remembers³³He remembers later but at the moment of his vow he was oblivious of the fact. that he had eaten or drunk, that I shall not eat or shall not drink, and he forgot and ate or drank. If he said, a qônām that my wife cannot enjoy anything from me because she stole my wallet or hit my son³⁴From another wife., and it turns out that she did not hit him or became known that she did not steal. If he saw people eating [his] figs and said to them, these are for you as qorbān³⁵It is to be assumed that people were not afraid to steal but would never break a vow., but the persons turned out to be his father or brothers with others. The House of Shammai say, these are permitted, those with them forbidden. But the House of Hillel say, these and those are permitted³⁶Since a vow which is partially voided is completely voided; Mishnah 9:6..

HALAKHAH: “An oath that I shall not eat this loaf,” etc. “An oath that I shall eat this loaf today,” the day passed and then he ate it. Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both say, he is not liable¹⁰³Criminal liability.; not for the same reason. The reason of Rebbi Joḥanan, because he cannot be duly warned¹⁰⁴No criminal prosecution is possible without evidence that the criminal was duly warned not to commit the crime (cf. Introduction to Tractate Sanhedrin, on Chapter Five). The warning must be delivered shortly before the criminal act, so the accused cannot claim to have forgotten. In this case criminality would be inaction; this is not subject to warning.
The Babli, 3b, brings the same example and connects this with the dispute between R. Joḥanan and R. Simeon ben Laqish whether a warning can be delivered even if it is conditional because there is no certainty that the contemplated action will be criminal (Yebamot11:7 Note 171, Nazir8:1 Note 48, Pesaḥim5:4 fol. 32c; Babli 3b). Since R. Joḥanan holds that a conditional warning is acceptable, the Babli is forced to switch the attributions in this case. As a consequence it follows that for the Yerushalmi here, in R. Joḥanan’s opinion this would not be a conditional warning but one which it is impossible to deliver. (In his Notes to Tosaphot s. v. אבל, Babli 4a, R. Akiba Eiger essentially notes that the Babli’s argument cannot be read into the Yerushalmi.). The reason of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, because it is a prohibition without action¹⁰⁵Cf. Note 3.. What is the difference between them? He burned it or threw it into the sea. If you say, because he cannot be duly warned¹⁰⁶Even if the witnesses are present at the moment when the loaf is thrown into the sea he cannot be warned since what he does is not breaking the oath but making its fulfillment impossible; there is no biblical paragraph prohibiting this action., he is not liable. If you say, because it is a prohibition without action, there is an action.