תלמוד על סוטה 5:1

Just as the woman accused of infidelity is forbidden to her husband, so she is forbidden to her paramour⁵⁴Mishnah Soṭah 5:1; Sifry Num. 19. Unless she is cleared from the accusation, she may not marry her presumed paramour after being divorced or after her husband’s death. Just as she is forbidden to her husband’s brother⁵⁵If her husband dies childless and her status was not clarified; Mishnah Soṭah 1:2., so she is forbidden to her paramour’s brother. I might think that just as the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is forbidden to her husband’s brother⁵⁶As explained at the end of this paragraph., so she should be forbidden to her paramour’s brother. Let us hear from the following⁵⁷Tosephta 14:3.: “A woman’s husband went overseas; they came and told her that her husband had died, and she had a levir here; he married her in levirate⁵⁸The husband was childless. and died. Then her husband returned. She is forbidden to him but her co-widow is permitted to him; she is forbidden to him but his brother’s wife is permitted to him⁵⁹The two parts of this sentence say the same: the co-widow is the brother’s wife..” Is his brother’s wife not like the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity? That means that the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is permitted to her paramour’s brother. Rebbi Judan said, this follows the rabbis there⁶⁰The Tosephta must be Babylonian. Since for the anonymous majority a woman married in incestuous levirate does not need a bill of divorce; she never was a co-wife in the legal sense and her disabilities cannot be transferred to her co-wives., as Rebbi Hila said, one states there²¹In Babylonia. The Babylonian text is quite different (Babli 94b): “For incestuous relationships no divorce is needed except for a married woman {whose husband had disappeared and} who remarried with the consent of the court; Rebbi Aqiba says also from his wife’s sister and his brother’s wife.” In all these cases, the marriages would have been valid if the information about the death of husband or wife or absence of a child had been true (explanation of RITBA)., for incestuous relationships no divorce is needed except for a married woman²²Since adultery is included in the chapter (Lev. 18) on incest prohibitions, it is technically considered incestuous.; Rebbi Aqiba says also from his wife’s sister²³Since a man may marry his deceased wife’s sister (Lev. 18:18). and his brother’s wife²⁴Who might be married in levirate. (not like the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity? That implies that the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is permitted to her paramour’s brother.)⁵¹The text in parentheses is dittography and is missing in Soṭah 1:2. But following the rabbis here? Rebbi Ḥiyya said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, everybody agrees that his brother’s wife needs a bill of divorce from him⁶¹This negates R. Judan’s premiss. because of the rule of a married wife. He married a person forbidden by the incest rules, and an incest-prohibited woman frees her co-wife. Rebbi Ḥananiah said, it is accepted even according to the rabbis here. They fined her but not her heirs⁶²This sentence is figurative speech. It means that in most cases of fines, the heirs are not responsible, so also in this case her disability is not transferred to her co-wives.. Rebbi Ḥananiah, the son of Rebbi Hillel, said, according to the rabbis there, she should be permitted to him⁶³Since according to the Babylonian rabbis an erroneous levirate does not necessitate a divorce, the wife committed unintentional adultery which does not cause a forced divorce except for Cohanim.. Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is forbidden, the co-wife of a divorcee⁶⁴A divorcee remarried by her ex-husband after a second marriage. The remarriage is forbidden but not incestuous. The Babli agrees, 11b. is permitted. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: All co-wives⁶⁵Of a woman in a forbidden but non-incestuous marriage. are permitted except the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity. Samuel said, the divorcee herself is permitted in her house⁶⁶If the husband died childless, she may be married in levirate.. Does he disagree? Since they were discussing co-wives they did not mention divorcees. Why is the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity forbidden? Rebbi Joḥanan said, they touched this case because it looks like adultery¹⁰The wife inadvertently committed adultery with the second husband. If it had been intentional she would be forbidden to both men (Mishnah Soṭah 5:1); inadvertent adultery is not a cause of forced divorce unless the husband is a Cohen. They treated the inadvertent adultery in this case under the rules of the intentional. This argument is not found in the Babli.. Rav said, because impurity is written there parallel to incest prohibitions⁶⁷Incestuous relations are declared impure in Lev. 18:24. Adultery is declared impure repeatedly in the law of the suspected wife, Num. 5:11–31. This argument is the only one given in the Babli, 11a..

¹⁰¹This is copied from Soṭah 5:2 (Notes 93–106, ס). In this paragraph, the corrector’s changes are copied from Soṭah and have to be accepted.“Rebbi Yose stated, from where that the fourth degree is disqualified in sanctified food? It is an argument. Since one who lacks expiation¹⁰²If a person is healed whose body was an original source of impurity, he needs immersion in water to be pure and also a ceremony of expiation to be admitted to the Sanctuary and sacrifices (for the person afflicted with skin disease, Lev, 14:32; for the persons healed from genital discharges 15:14–15, 29–30 for the woman after childbirth 12:6–8). After immersion in water, the person is totally pure (after the following sundown) at any place other than the Sanctuary. is not disqualified for heave¹⁰³Tosephta 3:17. but disqualified for sanctified food, it is only logical that third degree¹⁰⁴In the text here “fourth order,” not corrected by the corrector. The translated text here is from Soṭah. [impurity] which is disabled for heave should disqualify for sanctified food. That means, we learned third degree from a verse¹⁰⁵Mishnah Sotah 5:3 following R. Aqiba. and fourth degree from an argument de minore ad majus.” Rebbi Joḥanan objected: Food that was touched by a Tevul Yom¹⁰⁶Cf. Chapter 1, Note 168. is a counter-example, because he disqualifies in the case of heave but does not disqualify in the case of sanctified food¹⁰⁷Tosephta 3:16; Sifra Emor Pereq 4(8). It is proved that sacra are not in all respects more restrictive than heave. It is remarkable that the Babli does not argue against the thesis of R. Yose since it clearly violates the rule “it is enough if inference drawn from an argument be equal to the premise ” (Babli Bava qamma 25a). According to this rule, a passive impurity in the minor cannot become an active one in the major. The Yerushalmi knows no such rule; it needs the counter-example of R. Joḥanan. The difference between the Talmudim is that for the Yerushalmi, de minore ad majus is a rhetorical device but for the Babli it is part of a meta-logical system (cf. the author’s Logical Problems in Jewish Tradition, in: Confrontations with Judaism, Ph. Longworth, ed., London 1966 pp. 171–196.). Rebbi Ḥananiah¹⁰⁸In Sotah: R. Ḥiyya, the only possible reading since R. Ḥananiah was a teacher, not a student, of R. Joḥanan. in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Rebbi Yose argues the method of his teacher Rebbi Aqiba. Just as Rebbi Aqiba says impure, impure by the words of the Torah, so Rebbi Yose says it will be impure, it makes impure by the words of the Torah. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: Rebbi Yose does not need that argument de minore ad majus. Rebbi Yose explains the verse¹⁰⁹Lev. 7:19; Sifra Ṣaw Parasha 9. A similar interpretation is given as an additional baraita in the Babli 24a, Pesaḥim 18b/19a, Sotah 29b.: Any meat which would touch, that is second degree food because it touched primary impurity; anything impure, that is third degree food because it touched second degree impurity; shall not be eaten, the endstage of impurity may not be eaten. So far about solid food that became impure in the air space of a clay vessel which had become impure by a reptile¹¹⁰A dead reptile from the kinds enumerated in Lev. 11:29–30.. What about solid food that became impure directly from a reptile? Is that not an argument? Since vessels, which cannot become impure in the air space of a clay vessel that became impure by a reptile, become impure by contact with a reptile¹¹¹Vessels can become impure only from original impurity (a “father” or “grand-father” of impurity, never from derivative impurity.) There is no verse which would indicate otherwise (but in Pesaḥim 1:7, R. Ismael is quoted to the effect that Lev. 11:33 also applies to vessels. It may be a veiled reference to the argument presented here.) to defile solid food, is it not logical that solid food itself which became impure by a reptile should become impure by contact with a reptile to defile solid food. So far, following Rebbi Aqiba. Following Rebbi Ismael? Rebbi Ismael stated: ¹¹²Lev. 7:19.Any meat which would touch anything impure, that is first degree food which touched any impurity, shall not be eaten, to add a second degree of impurity. The third degree from where? It is an argument. Since a tevul yom who is not disqualified for profane food disqualifies heave, it is only logical that a person secondarily impure, who disables profane food should disable heave. The fourth degree for sacrifices from where? It is an argument. Since one who lacks expiation who does not disable heave disables sanctified food, it is only logical that third degree [impurity] which disqualifies heave should disable sanctified food. That means, we learned first and second degrees from a verse, the third from an argument and the fourth from an argument de minore ad majus. Can one pile argument on argument¹¹³It is a principle accepted in both Talmudim that at least for any rules of sacrifices and connected matters, most hermeneutical rules cannot be used one after the other; cf. Yebamot 8:1, Note 19. A detailed table of legal and illegal combinations, derived from Babli Zevaḥim Chapter 5, appears in the author’s paper Über ein bemerkenswertes logisches System aus der Antike, Methodos 1951, pp. 150–164.? Everything is subject to practice, i. e., that third degree disables heave and fourth degree disables sacrifices¹¹⁴Tosephta 3:8. “Practice” here corresponds to “Practice of Moses from Mount Sinai” in the Babli, generally accepted practice whose roots can no longer be ascertained. The status of such practice is more than rabbinic and less than biblical..

It was stated¹⁵⁴The same statement in Babli Yebamot 58a, Soṭa 24b.: “‘Except your husband,¹⁵⁵Num. 5:19.” which excludes that other semen preceded your husband’s¹⁵⁶If the affair with her paramour preceded her current marriage, the ordeal will be ineffective.. Rebbi Hila said, parallel what has been said, “except the morning elevation offering.¹⁵⁷Num. 28:23. While this verse is written at the end of the list of holiday sacrifices, it is obvious that the daily sacrifice precedes all others, Therefore, מִלְּבַד means really “after”. Similarly, מִבַּלְעֲדֵי אִישֵׁךְ should be translated: “after your husband”. (In Sifry Num. 13, Sifry Zuṭa 20, the verse is interpreted in two other, much different, ways.)” But did we not state: “Just as the water examines her, so the water examines him. Just as she is forbidden to her husband, so she is forbidden to her paramour”¹⁵⁸Mishnah 5:1.? Just as she is forbidden to her husband’s brother, so she is forbidden to her paramour’s brother¹⁵⁹This sentence is an intrusion from the preceding text, Note 128, induced by the similarly formulated Mishnah.. Just as the water examines her for every intercourse in which she receives her husband after [she had slept with] her paramour, so it examines him¹⁶⁰This baraita assumes that the ordeal is effective if the husband slept with his wife after she committed adultery. But the Mishnah excluded this case!? Rebbi Abin in the name of Rebbi Hila: Here, if he knows, there, if he does not know¹⁶¹The ordeal is effective if she committed adultery before the husband even became aware of a possible affair. He is not free from sin only if he sleeps with his wife after officially charging her and receiving notice that she was alone with her paramour..