תלמוד על יבמות 3:1
Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot
HALAKHAH: “A woman’s husband went overseas,” etc. As you say there7Mishnah 3:12, speaking of a bride who was switched in the night of the marriage., “these women one separates for three months to see whether they are pregnant. If they were minors not yet able to have a child one returns them at once.” Should one not say the same here8What is the difference between the bride who was led into the wrong chamber and the wife given wrong information?? There is a difference, since there others deceived them. Did here not also others deceive them? They instituted a fine so that she should investigate carefully9In biblical standards, there is no difference; she should be able to return to the first husband since the second marriage is nonexistent. By rabbinic decree they made the consequences of error so enormous that the presumed widow should investigate the report of her husband’s death very thoroughly.. Then they should fine her with respect to the second [husband] but not with respect to the first! Rebbi Joḥanan said, they touched this case because it looks like adultery10The wife inadvertently committed adultery with the second husband. If it had been intentional she would be forbidden to both men (Mishnah Soṭah 5:1); inadvertent adultery is not a cause of forced divorce unless the husband is a Cohen. They treated the inadvertent adultery in this case under the rules of the intentional. This argument is not found in the Babli.. Then she should not need a bill of divorce from him11If the second marriage is treated as adulterous, it is invalid and does not require a divorce.! There is a difference since she was married to him in a lawful manner12Since imperfect witnesses, even slaves, are accepted in court in cases involving a disappeared husband (Mishnah 15:4), the second marriage, based on imperfect witnesses, cannot be declared invalid.. Samuel said, I say, maybe he sent her a bill of divorce from overseas13The argument is given by Rav Huna, Rav’s student, in the Babli (88b). People would think that the woman entered on her second marriage after receiving a bill of divorce from overseas. If she could return from the second husband to the first without formality, people would think that a marriage may be dissolved without formality.. Rebbi Ḥaggai objected before Rebbi Ze‘ira: Did we not state14Mishnah 10:7. In the Babli, 88b/89a, the argument is anonymous.: “If they said to her, your husband has died, she was betrothed and then her husband came, she is permitted to return to him.” If you say, maybe he sent her a bill of divorce from overseas; should she not be forbidden to return to him15A divorcee may remarry her ex-husband only if she was not married to another man in the meantime, Deut. 24:1–4. The language of the verses makes it clear that this law applies only if the first marriage was consummated. Since, in general, “to take a wife” means to perform a formal betrothal (cf. Chapter 1, Notes 63, 95; Peah 6, Note 46), the prohibition is triggered by formal betrothal to the second husband.? But it must follow Rebbi Yose ben Kipper, as Rebbi Yose ben Kipper said, from betrothal it is permitted16To remarry one’s divorcee who was divorced from a second husband whose marriage was never consummated. This minority opinion is also quoted in the Babli, 88b, as background of Mishnah 10:7.. Did Rebbi Yose ben Kipper not agree that if the second husband gave her a bill of divorce that she was not disabled from priesthood? As we have stated14Mishnah 10:7. In the Babli, 88b/89a, the argument is anonymous., “even if the second husband gave her a bill of divorce, she was not disabled from priesthood.17The reason is spelled out in the Mishnah, that the betrothal was invalid and the dissolution of a non-marriage does not turn the woman into a divorcee forbidden to priests.” The rabbis of Caesarea in the name of Rebbi Hila: In order to make clear the prohibition of the first18This is a new explanation of the Mishnah. Even though the second marriage is in fact invalid, the court will require a divorce from the second husband to make clear that the woman is forbidden to return to her first husband..
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Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot
Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina asked before Rebbi Joḥanan: Here13Mishnah 4:10., you say, if his sister-in-law died, his wife is permitted to him, if his wife died, his sister-in-law is permitted to him, and here14Mishnah 3:1. If one of the brothers performs ḥalîṣah with the woman who became a widow later, the sister who first became a widow should be permitted to the other brother by the rule spelled out by R. Joḥanan; see below. you say so? He said to him, I do not know the reason for [the rule regarding] sisters15In the Babli, 27b, R. Joḥanan is quoted as saying that he does not know the author of Mishnah 3:1. This means he is unable to analyze the hidden premisses on which the ruling is based.. Rebbi Abba, Rebbi Ḥiyya, in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: I do not know the reason for [the rule regarding] sisters who are sisters-in-law16He spelled out that his criticism refers to Mishnah 3:1, not 4:10.. Rebbi Hila, Rebbi Yasa, in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The prohibition of sisters who are sisters-in-law cannot be compared to the prohibition of sisters who are not sisters-in-law. Rebbi Jeremiah said, explain it that the house fell on both [brothers] at the same time17Cf. Note 1. In that case, we do not know which of the two brothers died first; there are no discernible first and second widows to apply the rule of Mishnah 4:10. A similar argument in the Babli, 28a.. Rebbi Yose asked, did Rebbi Joḥanan say, I do not know the reason for [the rule regarding] sisters who are sisters-in-law if the house fell on both [brothers] at the same time? Only if they died one after the other. They wanted to say, what was the problem of Rebbi Joḥanan? If the second one died, why should the first one not be permitted to him? But if the first one died, the second should be forbidden to him. Rebbi Yudan said, both cases are the same problem for him. And candidacy counts for nothing since if there are three brothers,two of them paternal but not maternal halfbrothers, and two maternal but not paternal halfbrothers. If the paternal halfbrother died first18Brother 2 is paternal halfbrother of brother 1 and maternal halfbrother of brother 3. There is no relationship between 1 and 3. If 1 dies childless, his widow becomes a candidate for levirate with 2. and the second brother had no time to perform ḥalîṣah or levirate before he died, and she became eligible for his maternal halfbrother, may he not take her19If candidacy had given her some status comparable a wife of 2, she would be forbidden to 3. Since this case is never mentioned, one has to conclude that for 3 she is the widow of an unrelated man. In the Babli, Nedarim 74a, this position is ascribed to R. Aqiba, but not accepted by the other Sages.? This shows that candidacy is nothing, [otherwise] she should be forbidden as the maternal halfbrother’s wife.
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Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot
The argument of Rebbi Simeon seems to be inverted. There91Mishnah 3:10 where R. Simeon completely disregards “bespeaking” while here he even considers candidacy as obstacle., he says, “he marries in levirate the one he wants and performs ḥalîṣah with the other,” and here, he says so? Rebbi Ze‘ira said, when I was still there92In Babylonia. In the Babli, 31b, this argument is labelled rabbinic, not biblical., I learned the reason: There, the candidacy for two brothers-in-law does not interfere and one candidacy can be added to another, but here it is candidacy for one levir and no candidacy can come after a “bespeaking”93A comparison with the earlier quote (Note 85) shows that candidacy and “bespeaking” are put on one and the same level.. Rebbi Mattania said, are not sisters different from unrelated women? If you want a difficulty, find it in what Rebbi Ze‘ira said in the name of RavSheshet: They stated there that Rebbi Simeon forbade both of them94Halakhah 2:2, Note 47. In that case, Rebbi Simeon accepts “bespeaking” as marriage.. The argument of Rebbi Simeon seems to be inverted. There he says, both are forbidden, and here91Mishnah 3:10 where R. Simeon completely disregards “bespeaking” while here he even considers candidacy as obstacle. you says, both are permitted95No answer is given since the earlier explanation of R. Ze‘ira is also valid here..
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