תלמוד על שבועות 1:1

In the opinion of Rebbi Ismael, who does not refer this verse to those obligated for purification sacrifices and certain reparation sacrifices for whom the Day of Atonement had passed, it is understandable¹⁹This paragraph has no direct connection with the theme of the Mishnah, but is added here to elucidate Lev. 4:27. Since our halakhic Midrashim are all from the school of R. Aqiba, we have to accept the occasional indications of the Yerushalmi on the interpretations of the school of R. Ismael. For him, the verses 4:27–28 detail the conditions on which a private person is permitted and obligated to bring a purification offering.. But what is the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba, who refers this verse to those obligated for purification sacrifices and certain reparation sacrifices for whom the Day of Atonement had passed, as we have stated²⁰Mishnah Keritut 6:4; Sifra Wayyiqra 2 Paršetah 3(1), 6(1), Ahare Mot Parašah4(8).
Reparation sacrifices are required (1) for sins against a fellow man after restitution (Lev. 5:20–26; Num. 5:5–10), (2) misappropriation of sancta(Lev.5:14–16), (3) to regain sanctified status after skin disease (Lev. 14). A suspended reparation sacrifice is due if a person suspects that he may have committed an inadvertent sin, without having proof either way. Since the sin is forgiven on the Day of Atonement (with due repentance), such a sacrifice cannot be offered after that day since the scapegoat carries away all iniquities (Lev. 16:21).: From where that those obligated for purification sacrifices and certain reparation sacrifices for whom the Day of Atonement had passed, are obligated to bring them after the Day of Atonement, but those obligated for suspended reparation offerings are no longer liable? The verse says¹⁸Lev. 4:28. Since he was informed that he failed to commit the sin, he cannot bring a purification sacrifice. His repentance for his sinful intent will be a private matter between him and God., or his transgression in which he sinned was made known to him; he has to bring, even after the Day of Atonement. ²¹This copy from the first paragraph has no discernible meaning here. From the following: A person who would transgress; one would transgress; acting he would transgress; these are restrictions⁸The quotes are correct in the Yerushalmi text of the Babli editio princeps, but the first of the quotes in the Leiden ms. is a misquote, referring to Lev.4:2 instead of 4:27. The basic text is in Sifra Wayyiqra Parašah 7(1), referred to in Babli 2b, discussed in detail Šabbat93a.
Chapter 4 in Lev. treats the purification sacrifices for unintentional sin first by the High Priest (vv. 1–12), then the High Court (13–21), then a chief, identified in Mishnah 3:3 as a king (22–26), and finally by a commoner (27–35). V. 27 reads: If one person of the populace transgresses inadvertently, by acting on one prohibitions of the Eternal, and feels guilt. It is noted that the sentence seems to be unnecessarily wordy. Why does it not say simply, “if somebody inadvertently transgresses a prohibition of the Eternal”? The additional words must have a meaning; they describe restrictions. In Babli Šabbat93a one derives from the insistence that one person commit the sin that a violation of a commandment cannot be prosecuted if committed by two persons acting in common, so that no single person commits a punishable act but the combined result is a clear violation,. Such a violation cannot be atoned for by a purification sacrifice. It also is clear that only acts are punishable.
In the context here the additional terms are interpreted to mean that only a person acting on his own is required to offer a purification sacrifice; this excludes one who is told by a religious authority that his act is permitted.: the person depending on himself is liable, {but one dependent}⁹It is a generally recognized principle that a double restriction is an addition and a double addition a restriction (Peah 6:9 Note 154, Yebamot 12:1 Note 10, Sotah9:2 Note 63, Roš Haššanah 1:1 56a l.58, Megillah 4:4 75b l.14; Babli Megillah23b, Yoma 43a, Bava qamma 15b, Bava batra 15a, Sanhedrin 15a,44b,66a, Makkot 9b, Ševuot 7b, Menahot 9b,67a, Hulin 132a.) The principle is extended here to read that any even number of restrictions (additions) is an addition (restriction) while any odd number of restrictions (additions) is a restriction (addition); cf. Rashi in Sanhedrin 15a s. v. חמשה. on the Court is not liable.

HALAKHAH: He wants to teach himself a pretext⁷⁰This refers to the last sentence in Mishnah 5. Since this refers to a vow, which may be annulled by a rabbi or a court, all the restrictions described for oaths are eliminated. Even if he made his vow dependent on minute details, or refers to something in the past, or to minute quantities, or even to worthless things, the vow is valid since he only wants to find a pretext to divorce his wife.. “Whether matters of himself,” etc. Rebbi Abba in the name of Samuel: “An oath that X gave a mina to Y,” and it turns out that he did not give, since it was not in his power for the future, it is not in his power for the past⁷⁵He never could swear that X will give Y since it is not in his power to force X to give. This is all about liability for a variable sacrifice, not monetary liabilities. Since witnesses do not swear, this is not a case of perjury.. Rebbi Yose objected, about phylacteries there is nothing about the future but there is about the past⁷⁶If somebody swore falsely that he put on tefillin he is liable for a sacrifice (Mishnah 9).! He told him, phylacteries came from another source. To cause evil or cause good⁷²Lev. 5:4. The causative refers to the future.; just as doing good is optional so doing bad is optional; this excludes anything involving a prohibition or anything involving a permission⁷⁷The expression היתיר “permission” probably is induced by the usual opposites prohibition - permission. What really is intended here is מצוה “commandment” which is the opposite of something optional; Sifra Ḥova (Wayyiqra 2) Parashah9(6), Babli 27a.. Anything which one will blurt out, excluding a minor⁷⁸Whose words have no legal consequences.. A person in an oath, excluding a person not acting at his own will⁷⁹Sifra Ḥova (Wayyiqra 2) Parashah9(9), Babli 26a. This includes even a person acting by his own will on false information or false remembering.. And it will be forgotten by him, he will be oblivious of the oath. Or could I think that the object was forgotten by him? The verse says, in an oath and it was forgotten by him; he is liable for forgetting the oath; he is not liable for forgetting the object. Could one not add forgetting the object to forgetting the oath so that he should be liable? What is the difference between this and forgetting impurity and forgetting the Sanctuary so that he should be liable twice following Rebbi Ismael, who said forgetting impurity and forgetting the Sanctuary⁸⁰Chapter 1, Note 23.? There it is written it was forgotten by him, it was forgotten by him twice⁸¹Sifra Ḥova (Wayyiqra 2) Pereq12(7), Babli 14b; Mishnah 2:6.. Here it is written it was forgotten by him once. I could think that one who swears to the detriment of others should be liable: the verse says, to cause evil or cause good; just as doing good is optional so doing bad is optional⁸²Since harming anybody is forbidden, an oath to harm another person does not trigger liability for a sacrifice if it is broken. The example shows that in this case breaking the oath may be a meritorious act. Babli 27a.. I shall exclude one who swears to the detriment of another that he should not be liable. For example, if one swears that he will not provide food for another. He saw him in convulsions and gave to him.

HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Eliezer says,” etc. Ḥizqiah says, there is disagreement between them⁸⁷As explained in Halakhak 1, Note 45. R. Eliezer requires awareness of the cause of his impurity, R. Aqiba only requires awareness of impurity. This is the only opinion mentioned in the Babli, 18a.. Rebbi Joḥanan said, interpreting the verse is between them; there are Tannaim who state, he is liable for forgetting impurity but is not liable for forgetting the Sanctuary, and there are Tannain who state, he is liable for forgetting the crawling animal but is not liable for forgetting the Sanctuary⁸⁸RR. Eliezer and Aqiba only differ in the way they deduce the law from the verse, not in the substance of the meaning. The formulation is just a matter of style.. The argument of Rebbi Eliezer seems inverted⁸⁹This refers to Mishnah Keritut4:2 where R. Eliezer and R. Joshua disagree in the case that a person knows that he has inadvertently committed a sin which if intentional is either one subject to Divine extirpation or a capital crime, but he does not know which law he broke. Examples are a person who inadvertently ate a piece of meat which either was forbidden fat or disqualified sacrificial meat, or a man who slept with a woman but he does not know whether it was his wife during her menses or his sister. R. Eliezer declares him liable for a fixed value purification sacrifice since in any case he committed a deadly sin; R. Joshua declares him not liable (and therefore prevented from sacrificing) as long as he cannot specify which prohibition he broke. It is implied that in the case of a variable value reparation sacrifice for violation of the purity of the Sanctuary the opinions are switched; R. Eliezer requires knowledge of the kind of impurity (e. g., “a crawling animal”) whereas R. Joshua only requires awareness of impurity. Ḥizqiah would trace R. Aqiba’s opinion to his teacher R. Joshua.. There he says, even if he did not know. But here he says, not unless he knew. ⁹⁰The arguments quoted for R. Eliezer belong to R. Joshua and vice-versa. There, by which he sinned⁹¹Lev. 4:23, the purification sacrifice of the Prince. The verse insist, he became aware of his transgression by which he sinned, he can state the paragraph which he broke. But Lev. 5:2 only requires awareness of impurity., not unless he knew by what he became liable. Here, while he was impure⁸³Lev. 5:2., in all cases. Rebbi Ḥinena said, here “by what” is not written. The argument of Rebbi Joshua seems inverted. ⁹²This is R. Eliezer’s argument. As formulated in the Mishnah, he reads Lev. 5:2 as requiring awareness of the nature of his impurity (or, taking vv. 2,3 together, at least certain knowledge of the kind of impurity, whether simple or severe.) But in v. 4:23 and certainly v. 27, the purification sacrifice of a commoner, where it is only required that he sinned inadvertently, can be read as authorization for a sacrifice if only the fact was known that a sin was committed. There he says, while he was impure, not unless he knew by what he became liable. Here, by which he sinned, in any case. How does Rebbi Eliezer uphold by what? This excludes the one who is occupied⁹³Accepting that R. Eliezer refers to 4:27, the peculiar language of 4:23 still has to be explained. He excludes a person who was intent on doing something permitted when it happened that he broke a prohibition, e. g., that he was intent of sleeping with his wife when she was permitted to him and in the dark of night his sister substituted for her. She sinned but he did not..