תלמוד על שבועות 1:2

HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Eliezer says,” etc. Ḥizqiah says, there is disagreement between them⁸⁷As explained in Halakhak 1, Note 45. R. Eliezer requires awareness of the cause of his impurity, R. Aqiba only requires awareness of impurity. This is the only opinion mentioned in the Babli, 18a.. Rebbi Joḥanan said, interpreting the verse is between them; there are Tannaim who state, he is liable for forgetting impurity but is not liable for forgetting the Sanctuary, and there are Tannain who state, he is liable for forgetting the crawling animal but is not liable for forgetting the Sanctuary⁸⁸RR. Eliezer and Aqiba only differ in the way they deduce the law from the verse, not in the substance of the meaning. The formulation is just a matter of style.. The argument of Rebbi Eliezer seems inverted⁸⁹This refers to Mishnah Keritut4:2 where R. Eliezer and R. Joshua disagree in the case that a person knows that he has inadvertently committed a sin which if intentional is either one subject to Divine extirpation or a capital crime, but he does not know which law he broke. Examples are a person who inadvertently ate a piece of meat which either was forbidden fat or disqualified sacrificial meat, or a man who slept with a woman but he does not know whether it was his wife during her menses or his sister. R. Eliezer declares him liable for a fixed value purification sacrifice since in any case he committed a deadly sin; R. Joshua declares him not liable (and therefore prevented from sacrificing) as long as he cannot specify which prohibition he broke. It is implied that in the case of a variable value reparation sacrifice for violation of the purity of the Sanctuary the opinions are switched; R. Eliezer requires knowledge of the kind of impurity (e. g., “a crawling animal”) whereas R. Joshua only requires awareness of impurity. Ḥizqiah would trace R. Aqiba’s opinion to his teacher R. Joshua.. There he says, even if he did not know. But here he says, not unless he knew. ⁹⁰The arguments quoted for R. Eliezer belong to R. Joshua and vice-versa. There, by which he sinned⁹¹Lev. 4:23, the purification sacrifice of the Prince. The verse insist, he became aware of his transgression by which he sinned, he can state the paragraph which he broke. But Lev. 5:2 only requires awareness of impurity., not unless he knew by what he became liable. Here, while he was impure⁸³Lev. 5:2., in all cases. Rebbi Ḥinena said, here “by what” is not written. The argument of Rebbi Joshua seems inverted. ⁹²This is R. Eliezer’s argument. As formulated in the Mishnah, he reads Lev. 5:2 as requiring awareness of the nature of his impurity (or, taking vv. 2,3 together, at least certain knowledge of the kind of impurity, whether simple or severe.) But in v. 4:23 and certainly v. 27, the purification sacrifice of a commoner, where it is only required that he sinned inadvertently, can be read as authorization for a sacrifice if only the fact was known that a sin was committed. There he says, while he was impure, not unless he knew by what he became liable. Here, by which he sinned, in any case. How does Rebbi Eliezer uphold by what? This excludes the one who is occupied⁹³Accepting that R. Eliezer refers to 4:27, the peculiar language of 4:23 still has to be explained. He excludes a person who was intent on doing something permitted when it happened that he broke a prohibition, e. g., that he was intent of sleeping with his wife when she was permitted to him and in the dark of night his sister substituted for her. She sinned but he did not..

¹⁶⁹Babli 36b, Sifra Aḥare Parashah2(4–6), the entire paragraph. The starting sentence was added by the corrector, probably from one of the parallel sources.[It was stated: “How does he confess? “I acted criminally, I rebelled, I sinned;’ and it says¹⁷⁰Ex. 34:7., He forgives crime, rebellion, and sin; and it says¹⁷¹Lev. 16:21., and he shall confess over it all crimes of the Children of Israel, etc., the words of Rebbi Meïr. But the Sages say, criminal acts are intentional crimes, offenses are rebellions¹⁷²Sins intentionally committed as rebellion against God., sins are inadvertent actions¹⁷³Ševuot 1:3 (Note 114), Babli Ševuot12b, Keritut 25b.. After he confesses about criminal acts he turns around and confesses about inadvertent acts? But he confesses as follows: Please Hashem, I sinned, I acted criminally, I rebelled before You, I and my house (etc..) [and the sons of Aaron. As is written in the Torah of Moses as follows, for on that day he shall, etc. They, answer him: “Praised be the glory of His Kingdom forever and ever”.]¹⁷⁴The text in parentheses is the scribe’s, the one in brackets the corrector’s, probably added from one of the parallel sources. And so we find that confessors do confess. David said¹⁷⁵Ps. 106:6. The vaw added to the last word is from the synagogue service of the Day., we and our fathers sinned, we acted criminally and we led to bad behavior. His son Solomon said¹⁷⁶IK. 8:47., [we sinned,] we acted criminally, behaved badly. Daniel said¹⁷⁷Dan.9:5., we sinned, we actedcriminally, we led to bad behavior, and we rebelled. Also he was confessing thus: I sinned, I acted criminally, I rebelled before You. What means this which Moses said, He forgives crime, rebellion, and sin; and it says, and he shall confess over it all crimes of the Children of Israel, etc.¹⁷⁸How can one explain the illogical order?? But since he confesses to criminal rebellious acts, it is as if they were inadvertent sins before Him.”